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1

extra.’”

I.

INTRODUCTION

The words “shall not be assigned” probably ought to ask for a
raise based on the amount of work they have performed in
American courts. Parties often use such a phrase in contract
clauses prohibiting the parties from transferring their contractual
2
rights to third parties in a transaction known as an assignment.
Courts have agreed on very little concerning the form and effects
3
of anti-assignment clauses, other than the general rule that such
clauses are valid unless either the contract itself or a statute dictates
4
otherwise. In a contract, the innocent-looking words “shall not be
assigned” may have at least three different meanings, depending on
5
the court and the context.
As one commentator remarked,
“Unfortunately . . . the law on the subject is in a very confused
6
state.” Apparently, the courts have been working these words
particularly hard.
7
In the recent decision Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood,
the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the question of how it
8
would interpret the words of an anti-assignment clause. The court
concentrated on enforcing the plain language of the contract,
holding that as long as something in the contract demonstrated the
parties’ intent that the contractual rights would not be assignable,
9
the attempted assignment will be ineffective.
This stance
represents a break from the trend in other jurisdictions toward
construing such clauses strictly because they act as restraints on

1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
197 (Western Pub. Co. 1986) (1871).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(1) (1981) (“An
assignment of a right is a manifestation of the assignor’s intention to transfer it by
virtue of which the assignor’s right to performance by the obligor is extinguished
in whole or in part and the assignee acquires a right to such performance.”);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 128 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “assignment” as “[t]he
transfer of rights or property”).
3. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 138, at 931 (4th
ed. 2001) (explaining that courts have shown confusion on the subject).
4. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.
6. Grover C. Grismore, Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a Contract, 31
MICH. L. REV. 299, 300 (1933).
7. 683 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2004).
8. Id. at 269.
9. Id. at 272-74.
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10

alienation.
This Case Note first examines the history of anti-assignment
clauses, three approaches courts use to interpret anti-assignment
11
clauses, and Minnesota’s prior case law on the subject. Next, it
12
details the Travertine decision, critiques the court’s reasoning in
that case, and examines the policy implications of the court’s
13
holding.
The Case Note concludes that the court’s analysis
disregards some subtleties of case law and implications of policy in
reaching an inflexible standard of interpretation, instead of
following the modern trend toward strict construction of anti14
Because of this, Travertine may cause
assignment clauses.
inconsistencies in future cases, while denying Minnesota citizens
the benefits of the modern majority rule.
II. HISTORY
The history of non-assignment clauses in Anglo-American law
demonstrates a “basic tension between freedom of contract
15
principles and concerns about restraints on alienation.” Although
most cases demonstrate a trend toward imposing fewer restrictions
on assignments, courts have been pulled between the two
competing principles over the years and approaches vary based on
16
the jurisdiction and the circumstances.
A. Three Approaches
Under medieval common law, anti-assignment clauses were
entirely unnecessary. Assignments were not allowed because
17
contract rights were viewed as personal to the contracting parties.
This rule made sense in a society where defaulting debtors faced
10. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Selling Structured Settlements: The Uncertain Effect of
Anti-Assignment Clauses, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 787, 795-96 (2001) (stating the favored
approach to anti-assignment clauses “minimize[es] their restraint on alienation
consequences by interpreting them whenever reasonably possible as only imposing
a duty not to assign and not rendering this attempted assignment ineffective”); see
also infra Part II.A.2.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. Crespi, supra note 10, at 794.
16. Id.
17. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 11.2, at 781
(Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001); MURRAY, supra note 3, § 135, at 913.
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severe penalties and credit was infrequently used; attempts to
assign were viewed suspiciously, “as tending to encourage
18
litigation.”
During the seventeenth century, however, courts
19
started to enforce assignments, albeit grudgingly. First, the courts
allowed assignees to bring suits in the assignor’s name, but this
right was “fragile” because it was lost if the assignor revoked it,
20
died, or went bankrupt. Eventually, the courts of law followed the
chancery courts’ lead in granting assignees greater rights,
recognizing that if they did not, plaintiffs would simply go to the
21
chancellor to obtain the desired result.
By the late 1800s, courts regularly held contract rights freely
22
assignable, unless the terms of the contract indicated otherwise.
The Restatement (First) of Contracts promulgated this view: “A right
may be the subject of effective assignment unless . . . the
23
assignment is prohibited by the contract creating the right.” This
view is now undisputed, unless a specific statute dictates the
24
contrary. Courts, however, have not agreed on how to determine
25
when a contract has effectively prohibited assignment.
Three
approaches to interpreting the clauses are used by most courts.
The first approach holds that assignments made in violation of an
26
anti-assignment clause are invalid; the second approach considers
assignments breaches of the contract, unless specific words are
27
used to make the assignment invalid; and the third approach
upholds any assignment, rendering the anti-assignment clause
28
ineffective.
1.

Early Approach—Assignments Are Void

In cases dating back to the 1890s, some courts have held antiassignment provisions destroyed parties’ very ability to assign their

18. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 11.2, at 781.
19. Id. at 782.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 783.
22. See, e.g., LaRue v. Groezinger, 24 P. 42, 43 (Cal. 1890); Devlin v. New York,
63 N.Y. 8, 17 (1875).
23. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1932).
23. See Grismore, supra note 6, at 299.
25. See MURRAY, supra note 3, § 138, at 931 (listing three ways to interpret antiassignment clauses); Crespi, supra note 10, at 794-95 (listing four ways).
26. See infra Part II.A.1.
27. See infra Part II.A.2.
28. See infra Part II.A.3.
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29

contractual rights. Thus, any attempted assignments were void
30
and not breaches of the original contract, although the rule did
not prevent the purported assignee from maintaining rights against
31
the assignor. In the recent case Parrish Chiropractic Centers, P.C. v.
32
Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of Colorado
held a non-assignment clause stating that interest in the contract
might not be assigned without written consent eliminated the
33
insurance policy holders’ ability to assign their policy benefits. As
the court wrote, “[T]he public policy in favor of the freedom of
contract, and the corollary right of the insurer to deal only with the
party with whom it contracted, outweigh the general policy favoring

29. See Burck v. Taylor, 152 U.S. 634, 655 (1894); Tabler, Crudup & Co. v.
Sheffield Land, Iron & Coal Co., 79 Ala. 377, 378-80 (1885) (holding labor tickets
which had the words “not transferable” on them could not be assigned by
employees who received them for the labor they had done); Behrens v. Cloudy, 97
P. 450, 451 (Wash. 1908) (holding attempted assignment by a lessee of an option
to purchase “confer[red] no benefits on the assignee” because of a contract clause
under which the lessee agreed not to “assign this lease or any part thereof without
. . . written consent”). For modern cases, see, e.g., Kent General Hospital, Inc. v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Del., Inc., 442 A.2d 1368, 1370-72 (Del. 1982)
(holding an anti-assignment clause that stipulated “payment shall not be
assignable without the written approval of [Blue Cross]” allowed Blue Cross not to
honor assignments of health insurance benefits made by its insureds to Kent
General Hospital); Augusta Medical Complex, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Kan., Inc., 634
P.2d 1123, 1125, 1127 (Kan. 1981) (holding an anti-assignment clause providing
that “benefits of the Contract . . . are not assignable” was “valid and enforceable”
by Blue Cross); Cloughly v. NBC Bank-Seguin, N.A., 773 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex.
App. 1989) (concluding an anti-assignment clause stating that the “Seller shall not
have the right to make any assignment . . . without the prior written consent of the
Purchaser” made an attempted assignment invalid).
30. MURRAY, supra note 3, § 138, at 931; see supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
31. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 242 B.R. 767, 771 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999) (“[T]he
anti-assignment clause is to be construed ‘for the benefit of the obligor, and not to
prevent the assignee from acquiring rights against the assignor.’” (quoting FoxGreenwald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz Bros. Inc., 452 F.2d 1346, 1351 (D.C. Cir.
1971))); Garden State Bldgs., L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 702 A.2d 1315, 1322
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“An anti-assignment clause protects the obligor
and does not affect the transaction between the assignor and the assignee.”); In re
Kaufman, 37 P.3d 845, 855 (Okla. 2001) (“[A]n assignor of a contract containing a
valid anti-assignment provision may not invoke the clause as against its assignee.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(c) (1981) (“A contract term
prohibiting assignment of rights under the contract, unless a different intention is
manifested . . . is for the benefit of the obligor, and does not prevent the assignee
from acquiring rights against the assignor . . . .”).
32. 874 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1994).
33. Id. at 1051, 1054.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 3
08JOY_ANDERSON.DOC

1440

5/31/2006 1:14:25 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

34

the free alienability of choses in action.” Under this approach,
the words used in the anti-assignment clause matter little. As long
as the contract “prohibits assignment in ‘very specific’ and
‘unmistakable terms’ the assignment will be void against the
35
obligor.”
Cases from several jurisdictions—for example,
36
37
Colorado and Washington —still follow this approach, refusing
to enforce assignments made in violation of an anti-assignment
clause, regardless of the wording of the prohibition.
2.

Modern Approach—Assignments Are Breaches of the Contract

Some courts have distinguished between the right to assign and
the power to assign, holding that generally-worded anti-assignment
38
clauses destroy the right but not the power. In other words, a
person who signs a contract with a provision saying rights “shall not
be assigned” retains the ability, or the power, to make a valid
assignment, but the clause eliminates the person’s right to do so
without breaching the contract. Under this theory, the nonassignment clause is merely a promise creating a duty not to
39
assign. Thus, when the assignor breaches this duty, the obligor
will be able to sue for breach, but the assignor’s rights under the
40
assignment will have passed validly to the assignee. This means a
promise not to assign, like most other contractual promises, is not
self-executing; a court order for specific performance would be
needed to make the promisee fulfill the promise, rather than pay
41
for any damages caused by breaching it. In early cases, courts
42
often followed this approach in special situations—for leases, land

34. Id. at 1054.
35. Portland Elec. & Plumbing Co. v. City of Vancouver, 627 P.2d 1350, 1351
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (holding an anti-assignment clause that said the plaintiff
contractor “shall not assign” the contract “without the prior written approval”
prevented the contractor from assigning a claim for non-payment by the city); see
also Parrish Chiropractic, 874 P.2d at 1055 (“When a contractual provision is clear
and unambiguous, courts should neither rewrite it nor limit its effect by a strained
construction.”).
36. Parrish Chiropractic, 874 P.2d at 1054.
37. Portland Elec., 627 P.2d at 1351.
38. MURRAY, supra note 3, § 138, at 931; Crespi, supra note 10, at 795.
39. MURRAY, supra note 3, § 138, at 931; Crespi, supra note 10, at 795.
40. MURRAY, supra note 3, § 138, at 931.
41. See Grismore, supra note 6, at 303 (“It is extremely difficult to see why
such a promise, more than any other, should be made self-executing.”).
42. Id. at 303 (listing lease cases including Garcia v. Gunn, 51 P. 684 (Cal.
1897); Randol v. Tatum, 33 P. 433 (Cal. 1893); and Den v. Post, 25 N.J.L. 285
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sales, and assignments of the right to receive payment.
An increasing number of courts are following this second
approach, holding assignments effective as long as the contract’s
non-assignment clause does not expressly take away the parties’
power to assign or state that attempted assignments would be
45
invalid.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts propounds this
approach: “A contract term prohibiting assignment of rights under
the contract, unless a different intention is manifested . . . gives the
obligor a right to damages for breach of the terms forbidding
46
assignment but does not render the assignment ineffective.” In
47
the recent case Rumbin v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., the Supreme
Court of Connecticut examined several dozen cases and concluded
the majority of jurisdictions followed this rule, which the court
48
called the “modern approach.” This rule, the court explained,

(1855)).
43. Id. at 303-04 (discussing land contract cases including Hull v. Hostettler,
194 N.W. 996 (Mich. 1923) and Grigg v. Landis, 21 N.J. Eq. 494 (1870)).
44. See Portuguese-Am. Bank of S.F. v. Welles, 242 U.S. 7 (1916); State St.
Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 177 N.E. 702 (Ill. 1931), noted in Grismore, supra
note 6, at 306.
45. See, e.g., Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite, Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1999);
Cedar Point Apts., Ltd. v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 F.2d 748, 754 (8th Cir.
1982); Garden State Bldgs., L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 702 A.2d 1315, 1321 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); see also Crespi, supra note 10, at 794 (“[I]n recent years
. . . the adverse consequences of restraints on alienation have become better
appreciated.”).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(b) (1981).
47. 757 A.2d 526 (Conn. 2000).
48. Id. at 533. The Rumbin court’s list of cases supporting the modern rule
included opinions applying law from the following eleven states: Arizona
(Hanigan v. Wheeler, 504 P.2d 972 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)), California (Randol v.
Tatum, 33 P. 433, 433 (Cal. 1893)), Delaware (Paccom Leasing Corp. v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., Civ. A. Nos. 89-255-CMW, 90-311-CMW, 1991 WL 226775,
at *7 (D. Del. Oct. 30, 1991)), Florida (In re Freeman, 232 B.R. 497 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1999)), Illinois (Lomas Mortgage U.S.A., Inc. v. W.E. O’Neil Constr. Co., 812
F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1993)), Michigan (Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (E.D. Mich. 1998)), Missouri (Cedar Point Apts., 693 F.2d at
754), New Jersey (Bel-Ray Co., 181 F.3d at 442), New York (Allhusen v. Caristo
Constr. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1952)), Utah (U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross
& Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 1988)), and Vermont (Grieve v. Gen. Am.
Life Ins. Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Vt. 1999)). Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 532-35.
Decisions from Texas are split: The court in Rumbin listed one as following the
modern approach (Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. McKinnon, 688 S.W.2d 612, 615
(Tex. App. 1985)) and another as backing the older rule that holds assignments
invalid regardless of the language in the anti-assignment clause (Cloughly v. NBC
Bank-Seguin, N.A., 773 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex. App. 1989)). Rumbin, 757 A.2d at
532-34.
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“offers the advantage of free assignability together with full
protection for any obligor who actually suffers damages as a result
of an assignment,” because the obligor would be able to sue the
49
assignor for any losses that in fact resulted.
The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts also explains that concern about restraints on
alienation is the basis for its rule for interpreting anti-assignment
clauses: “[T]he policy which limits the validity of restraints on
alienation has been applied to the construction of contractual
50
terms open to two or more possible constructions.”
But courts have been inconsistent in deciding when a nonassignment clause sufficiently manifests an intention to make the
51
assignment invalid. Some courts make distinctions based on the
precise wording of the non-assignment clause, requiring the
contract to expressly state that attempted assignments are “void” or
52
“invalid” before voiding the assignment. A subset of these courts
also will invalidate assignments if the contract asserted that the
53
“power to assign” was precluded. Other jurisdictions follow an
approach suggested by a Restatement (Second) comment, which states
54
the decision depends on “all the circumstances.” The comment
explains that courts may need to examine other factors because the
same words may have different meanings depending on their
context; for example, “‘[n]ot transferable’ has a clear meaning in a
theater ticket; in a certificate of deposit the same words may refer

49. Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 534.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. a (1981).
51. Crespi, supra note 10, at 796-97.
52. E.g., Garden State Bldgs., L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 702 A.2d 1315, 1321
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding assignment invalid because the clause
said assignments without consent “shall be void”); Univ. Mews Assocs. v.
Jeanmarie, 471 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (explaining the anti-assignment
clause “must contain express provisions that any assignment shall be void or
invalid if not made in a certain specified way”).
53. Liberty Life Assurance Co. v. Stone St. Capital, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 630,
638 (D. Md. 2000) (holding anti-assignment clause that took away the power to
assign made assignment invalid); Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23 (same); Rumbin,
757 A.2d at 535 (holding assignment valid because the contract did not expressly
limit power to assign).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. c (1981); see also Bank
of Am., N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 322, comment c, and holding assignment invalid after
considering the alternative remedy, a claim for breach of contract); Henderson v.
Roadway Express, 720 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding the
assignment invalid because the anti-assignment clause was a “bargained-for
provision that was intended to benefit all parties”).
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55

to negotiability rather than assignability.”
Despite the
inconsistency, most of the courts that have recently considered the
56
issue have followed one of the forms of the modern approach.
3.

Statutory Approach—Anti-Assignment Clauses Are Invalid

The third approach holds anti-assignment clauses themselves
ineffective. Under this theory, such clauses neither invalidate
57
58
assignments nor create a cause of action for breach of contract;
instead, all contract terms are assignable. This approach is limited
to contracts that fall under statutes covering particular situations
and is prompted by the same concerns about restrictions on
alienation that inform the “modern approach” to anti-assignment
clauses.
One of the most widely used examples of an anti-assignment
statute is contained in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
59
which has been adopted in almost all jurisdictions. Section 406 of
Article 9 invalidates terms that restrict or prohibit assignments of
60
accounts, which are payment obligations arising from regular
61
commercial transactions for both “goods sold” and “services
62
A comment in the Code states that the provision
rendered.”
“build[s] on common-law developments that essentially have
eliminated legal restrictions on assignments of [certain] rights to
63
payment.”
State and federal statutes with similar effects cover a variety of
situations.
Assignments of wages to creditors, with a few

55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. c (1981).
56. Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 535.
57. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-406(d)(1) (2000) (stating “a term in an agreement
between an account debtor and an assignor” that prohibits assignment is
ineffective).
58. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-406(d)(2) (2000) (stating “a term in an agreement
between an account debtor and an assignor” that an assignment may give rise to a
breach is ineffective).
59. Crespi, supra note 10, at 792.
60. U.C.C. § 9-406(d). For exceptions see U.C.C. § 9-109(d) (2000).
61. Crespi, supra note 10, at 792.
62. U.C.C. § 9-106 (2000); see also Knecht Bros. v. Ames Constr., Inc., 404
N.W.2d 859, 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (applying Minnesota Statutes section
336.9-318(4), then Minnesota’s version of U.C.C. section 9-406(d), to determine
that a subcontractor for a seeding project could assign its rights to payment from
the general contractor to its financiers, despite an anti-assignment clause in the
contract).
63. U.C.C. § 9-406 cmt. 5 (2000).
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exceptions, are prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission’s
64
Many states have similar rules, often
Creditor Practices Rule.
65
based on a provision from the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
These rules are based on the recognition that such assignments
interfere with employment, disrupt family finances, and deny
debtors a chance to defend themselves before their wages are
66
subject to collection.
Some states decided that rights to the
payment of money always should be assignable; for example, an
Arkansas statute states that all written agreements for the payment
67
of money or property “shall be assignable,” a statement the
Arkansas Supreme Court held invalidated an anti-assignment
68
clause in a health insurance contract.
And under federal
bankruptcy law, a trustee in bankruptcy has the ability to assign an
69
executory contract or lease despite an anti-assignment restriction.
Despite these examples, the applications of this approach
remain restricted. Courts have not been willing to flout the
common law acceptance of anti-assignment clauses by holding
clauses invalid in the absence of statutes specifically invalidating the
clauses.
B. Mixing Approaches
Over the centuries, courts’ general position on the assignment
of contract rights has rotated 180 degrees, from the days when
assignments were not recognized at all to the current proliferation
of statutes that stop parties from preventing assignments. But the

64. MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 11:5 (2006).
65. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.305(1) (1974) (“A creditor may not
take an assignment of earnings of the consumer for payment or as security for
payment of a debt arising out of a consumer credit transaction. An assignment of
earnings in violation of this section is unenforceable by the assignee of the
earnings and revocable by the consumer.”). Many states have adopted laws on this
topic. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-43-304 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-3-305
(1995); MINN. STAT. § 181.05 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 2-410 (2004); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 40-14-334 (2005).
66. PRIDGEN, supra note 64, at § 11:5. Such provisions may interfere with
employment by leaving an employee with little incentive to perform adequately:
“From the viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference between not
earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 245 (1934).
67. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-58-102 (West 2005).
68. Am. Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 773 S.W.2d 831, 834
(Ark. 1989).
69. 11 U.S.C.S. § 365(f)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/3

10

Anderson: Contracts—Looking for "Something": Minnesota's New Rule for Inter
08JOY_ANDERSON.DOC

2006]

5/31/2006 1:14:25 PM

INTERPRETING ANTI-ASSIGNMENT CLAUSES

1445

overall march toward free assignability has not been without many
meanderings and detours. Approaches vary significantly between
jurisdictions, and in any particular case, the court’s decision
depends as much on the policies it wishes to promote under those
specific circumstances as on the jurisdiction’s overall approach.
For example, in cases involving assignments of payments from
tort victims’ structured settlements, some courts are particularly
willing to hold assignments invalid when made in contravention of
an anti-assignment clause because of the desire to protect the tort
70
victim. Several courts also have concluded that assignments of
health insurance benefits should be invalidated because the antiassignment clauses in the health insurance contracts supported the
compelling public policy of controlling the growth of medical
71
costs. Thus, the rule for anti-assignment contracts is anything but
consistent; the case law is filled with quirks and caveats that depend
on the wording of the contract, any applicable statutes, and
possibly public policies, apart from the general approach adopted
by the state.
C. Minnesota Case Law
In Minnesota, case law on the subject of anti-assignment
72
clauses is limited; until recently, Minnesota’s courts apparently
had not adopted any of the interpretive approaches for general
73
use. In Wilkie v. Becker, the court stated a right to payment of
money could be assigned “unless there is something in the terms of
70. See, e.g., Liberty Life Assurance Co. v. Stone St. Capital, Inc., 93 F. Supp.
2d 630, 633-34 (D. Md. 2000) (determining that no Missouri cases specifically
address the assignment of a right to payments under a structured settlement;
considering other states’ structured settlement cases instead of looking to Missouri
cases that addressed other anti-assignment clauses in general). For a detailed
analysis of structured settlement cases, see infra notes 160-166 and accompanying
text.
71. See, e.g., St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., 810
F. Supp. 1209, 1220 (D. Kan. 1992); Parrish v. Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med.
Servs. Co., 754 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc. v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Del., Inc., 442 A.2d 1368, 1371-72 (Del. 1982). In
these cases, insureds had attempted to assign benefits from their health insurance
contracts to medical providers who did not have contracts with the insurance
company. These assignments eliminated any incentive for those providers to enter
contracts with the insurance company, contracts that would limit the amount the
providers could charge for services.
72. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 670 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn. 2004).
73. 268 Minn. 262, 128 N.W.2d 704 (1964).
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the contract manifesting the intention of the parties that it shall
74
not be assigned.” However, the court did not specify what terms
were needed to qualify as that “something” manifesting intention,
or what the effects on the parties would be if that “something” were
included. Three decades later, in Vetter v. Security Continental
75
Insurance Co., the court repeated the general rule that assignments
were allowed “in the absence of a contractual provision to the
76
contrary,” again without specifying what that provision ought to
say or how it should be interpreted. Reflecting the general
confusion in this area, recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions
involving anti-assignment provisions followed each of the first two
77
approaches. In S O Designs USA, Inc. v. Rollerblade, Inc., the court
assumed an assignment in violation of an anti-assignment clause
78
79
was valid; but in Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Mount Sinai Hospital,
the court held the attempted assignment was not effective until the
80
anti-assignment clause was waived.
Minnesota also has statutes following the third approach,
making anti-assignment clauses ineffective under certain
81
circumstances.
Furthermore, case law suggests assignments
cannot be prohibited in some situations. In Wilkie, the Minnesota
Supreme Court stated that the right to receive money due under a
contract “may be assigned even though the contract itself may not
82
be assignable.” In another case, the court of appeals suggested
contracts may not prohibit the right to receive damages for a
83
breach of contract. Thus, Minnesota has case law that uses all

74. Id. at 267, 128 N.W.2d at 707.
75. 567 N.W.2d 516 (Minn. 1997).
76. Id. at 521.
77. 620 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
78. Id. at 55.
79. No. C7-01-1287, 2002 WL 378129, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2002).
80. Id. at *3.
81. See MINN. STAT. § 336.9-406 (2004) (Minnesota’s version of U.C.C. § 9-406
(2000)); MINN. STAT. § 181.05 (2004) (making assignments of unearned wages or
salary invalid).
82. Wilkie v. Becker, 268 Minn. 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1964); see also
In re Jones, 337 F. Supp. 620, 625 (D. Minn. 1971) (“[I]t is possible under
Minnesota law to assign the proceeds of a contract even if the contract itself is not
assignable.”).
83. Mears Park Holding Corp. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 281, 284
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“In analyzing anti-assignment provisions, a distinction
must be drawn between the right to assign performance under a contract, which
may be prohibited, and the right to receive damages for its breach, which may not
be prohibited.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(a)
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three approaches, although no case specifically analyzes and adopts
a particular position. Against this confused backdrop, Travertine
84
Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood arrived on the Minnesota court scene.
III. THE TRAVERTINE DECISION
A. Facts
In Travertine, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced the anti85
assignment question that had perplexed so many other courts.
The case began with James Lennon and George Berkey’s formation
86
of a real estate company, Travertine Corp., in 1989. Lennon and
Berkey found investors for the corporation, which then purchased
87
960 acres of real estate in California. Lennon and Berkey planned
to prepare the land for residential development and sell it to a
88
To further that end, Lennon and Berkey signed a
developer.
89
management agreement with Travertine Corp., which entitled the
pair to a percentage of Travertine’s net profits from the land sale
and provided for “reasonable compensation for their services to
90
date” if the agreement were terminated.
The agreement also
stated that Lennon and Berkey would serve on the corporation’s
board of directors and as corporate officers, it bound all parties to
arbitration in case of a dispute, and asserted it would be binding on
91
the parties’ “representatives, successors and assigns.”
The
contract included a non-assignment clause stating that “the rights
and obligations of Berkey/Lennon shall not be assignable except
that Berkey may assign to Lennon or Lennon assign to Berkey such

(1981).
84. 683 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2004).
85. Id. at 269.
86. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp. at 3, Travertine Corp. v. LexingtonSilverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2004) (No. A-03-0210).
87. Id.; Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 3, Travertine Corp. v. LexingtonSilverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267 (No. A-03-0210).
88. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 87, at 3.
89. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at 4.
90. Id. at A-32. The percentage of compensation the managers were entitled
to receive shrank the longer the land remained unsold. If the property sold within
eighteen months, the managers would receive 50%; if it sold between eighteen
and thirty-six months, 40%; and if the sale took place after thirty-six months, 25%.
Id. at A-30.
91. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn.
2004).
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92

rights and obligations.”
Seven years later, to settle a judgment against him in an
unrelated matter, Lennon attempted to assign his rights to
compensation under the management agreement to Lexington93
Silverwood, a Minnesota limited partnership.
The agreement
between Lennon and Lexington-Silverwood did not discharge
Lennon’s personal liability if payment from the assignment were
94
not received. In May 1998, Lennon delivered an agreement with
VGS Consulting to sell Travertine’s property for $22.5 million, but
the deal’s closing date was postponed four times, and the sale was
95
finally cancelled.
According to Lennon, the deal fell apart
because Travertine’s board of directors made “commercially
unreasonable” demands on buyers while some of its members were
96
offering to buy the property themselves at “a bargain price.” In
1999, Travertine’s board of directors first removed Lennon from
the board and then terminated him as president, leaving the
remaining Travertine board members in control of day-to-day
97
operations. Finally, citing Lennon’s inability to find a “willing and
98
qualified buyer,” Travertine’s directors and shareholders voted to
99
cancel the management agreement in January 2000. Travertine
Corp. had not paid Lennon any proceeds under the management
agreement because the land had not been sold, and Lennon
received no compensation upon termination despite the provision
in the agreement for “reasonable compensation” for services he
100
had contributed upon termination.
B. Procedure
Lexington-Silverwood filed a demand for arbitration, arguing
Lennon’s assignment entitled the partnership to compensation of
$3 million to $4.5 million, which Lexington-Silverwood said
92. Id. at 269-70. In 1992, Berkey assigned his rights to Lennon. Id. at 270.
93. Id. at 270. The judgment against Lennon was for $757,774. Brief of
Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at 5-6, A-39. Lennon’s stock in
Travertine Corp. already was subject to liens worth $226,170 when he attempted
the assignment. Id. at A-39.
94. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 87, at 22.
95. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at 7, A-24.
96. Id. at A-26.
97. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 87, at 6.
98. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at 2.
99. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 87, at 7.
100. Id.; see Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at A-21.
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101

Lennon had earned by delivering VGS Consulting’s offer.
102
Travertine refused to pay and moved to stay arbitration. The trial
court held Lennon’s assignment was invalid because it was an
agreement to transfer future compensation, whereas an assignment
103
must be a present transfer of rights; and even if the assignment
104
were valid, it did not include the right to compel arbitration.
With the assignment invalid, the trial court granted the motion to
105
stay arbitration.
106
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The
107
court cited Wilkie v. Becker for the proposition that the right to
receive payment could be assigned, unless “something” in the
108
contract’s terms showed the parties intended otherwise. Because
no language in the management agreement specifically addressed
109
that right, the court turned to an Eighth Circuit case, Cedar Point
Apartments, Ltd. v. Cedar Point Investment Corp., which applied
110
Missouri law.
Cedar Point Apartments adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts’ position on anti-assignment clauses and
interpreted the provision as requiring specific language limiting
the power to assign or stating assignments would be void before
111
assignments would be held ineffective.
The Travertine-Lennon
112
contract had no such language and it expressly contemplated
assignments when it provided assignees would be bound to its
113
terms. Therefore, the court decided, the clause did not make the
101. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at A-27.
102. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Minn.
2004).
103. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at A-48. The trial
court cited Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 504 N.W.2d 284 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) in support of this point. Id.
104. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at A-49 to A-50.
105. Id. at A-50.
106. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 670 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn. 2004).
107. 268 Minn. 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1964).
108. Travertine, 670 N.W.2d at 447.
109. Id. at 447-48.
110. Id. at 447 (citing Cedar Point Apts., Ltd. v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693
F.2d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 1982)).
111. Id. at 447-48 (noting that Cedar Point Apartments followed the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 322(2)).
112. See id. at 448.
113. Id.; see also Cedar Point Apts., 693 F.2d at 754 (stating that the contract
clause binding the parties and their assigns to the contract strongly supported the
inference that the non-assignment provision was not meant to prohibit the power
to make assignments).
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C. The Supreme Court’s Decision
115

The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, reversed again. In
an opinion written by Justice Russell Anderson, the court
concluded that regardless of whether the state followed the
Restatement (Second) position on anti-assignment clauses, the
116
Lexington-Silverwood assignment would be invalid.
First, the
court considered the Restatement (Second) provision and decided it
“need not” adopt the rule because “well-established” Minnesota
117
118
precedent on the issue already existed.
Using Wilkie v. Becker
119
and Vetter v. Security Continental Insurance Co., the court repeated
the standard used by the court of appeals that there must be
“something” in the contract showing the parties intended the right
120
to receive payment would not be assignable.
No specific terms
were required by these cases, the supreme court added, merely
121
some indication of the parties’ intent.
Although relying on the
same case as the court of appeals, the supreme court reached the
opposite conclusion; the statement that “the rights and obligations
of Berkey/Lennon shall not be assignable” qualified as the
122
required “something” indicating intent.
Under Minnesota
precedent, the court held, Lennon’s ability to assign his rights was
123
destroyed, so the assignment was invalid.
According to the supreme court, the assignment would have
124
been void even under the modern Restatement (Second) approach.
The court rejected the interpretation of the Restatement’s provision
125
favored by the court of appeals.
Instead, the court followed
114. Travertine, 670 N.W.2d at 448.
115. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Minn.
2004).
116. Id. at 272, 274.
117. Id. at 272 (citing Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1385
(Pa. 1991) as stating that courts have the “obligation” to refuse to apply a
Restatement rule that runs contrary to precedent).
118. 268 Minn. 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1964).
119. 567 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 1997).
120. Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 272 (quoting Wilkie, 268 Minn. at 267, 128
N.W.2d at 707).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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126

Judge Posner’s analysis from Bank of America, N.A. v. Moglia,
which rejected the need for “magic words” such as “power” or
127
“invalid” in the non-assignment clause.
Instead of “impos[ing]
formulaic restraints” on contract language, the Minnesota court
held the better approach would be holding assignments void as
long as assignment was prohibited in “specific and unmistakable
128
terms.”
The language in the Travertine-Lennon contract
qualified as unmistakable, the court stated: “[I]t is difficult to
identify a clearer way to communicate an intent to deny a party the
129
power to assign than to expressly say so.”
Thus, under either
rule, the court held Lexington-Silverwood could not enforce the
130
assignment.
D. Case Epilogue
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision that the assignment
was invalid made it extremely unlikely Lexington-Silverwood could
recover anything for its $750,000 judgment against Lennon. Under
the assignment, Lennon still was responsible for the debt if the
131
assigned payments were not delivered, but Lennon filed for
bankruptcy six months after the management agreement was
132
cancelled, disclosing $23,000 in assets and $4.2 million in debts.
After Lexington-Silverwood lost its bid to enforce the assignment,
Lennon wanted to proceed against Travertine on his own behalf, a

126. 330 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2003).
127. Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 273-74 (quoting Bank of Am., 330 F.3d at 948).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 273-74. However, the terms of the contract did not expressly deny
the parties the power to assign; the contract said the “rights . . . shall not be
assignable . . . .” Id. at 269.
130. Id. at 274. The supreme court did not discuss whether Minnesota’s
version of section 9-406(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code applied to the case,
presumably because the court assumed the situation fell under one of the section’s
exemptions. See U.C.C. §§ 9-109(d)(3) (2000) (exempting assignments for claims
of wages), 9-109(d)(7) (exempting assignments of single accounts to satisfy a preexisting debt). Neither did the court apply Minnesota Statutes section 181.05,
which makes an assignment of unearned wages or salary void. The court stated
the record was “inconclusive” in establishing whether Lennon was Travertine’s
employee and when he had earned the compensation purportedly assigned to
Lexington-Silverwood. Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 270 n.2.
131. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 87, at 5-6.
132. In re Lennon, Bk. No. BK-S-01-17252-BAM, at 3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 20,
2005). Lennon’s debts included the Lexington-Silverwood debt and $2.8 million
in priority tax claims that would not be discharged by the bankruptcy proceedings.
Id. at 12.
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133

claim he said was worth $15 million.
The trustee in bankruptcy,
disagreeing with this “overly optimistic” analysis, settled the claim
134
against Travertine for $900,000.
Lexington-Silverwood protested
against the settlement to no avail, and it was approved by the
135
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit.
In the final analysis, Travertine likely realized a windfall when
it sold the property, since it did not have to pay anyone the twentyfive percent it would have owed Lennon under the management
136
agreement.
Lexington-Silverwood, meanwhile, was left with a
cause of action against a deeply indebted bankruptcy estate, and
Lennon lost any hope of seeing a benefit from his work for
Travertine.
If Lennon’s assignment to Lexington-Silverwood had been
held valid despite the anti-assignment clause, the situation for
Lennon would have been equally grim. Lexington-Silverwood
would have received any proceeds directly from Travertine,
137
bypassing Lennon’s bankruptcy estate.
Travertine would have
been able to sue the bankruptcy estate for any damages it incurred
because of the assignment, but because the assignment merely
would have forced Travertine to send a check to a different party, a
138
viable suit appears unlikely.
Lexington-Silverwood might have
been the party with a windfall under this scenario, if the proceeds
under the management agreement were larger than Lennon’s debt
to it.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Travertine, the Minnesota Supreme Court reached a
conclusion backed by numerous cases; anti-assignment clauses

133. Id. at 4.
134. Id. at 4, 14. The trustee cited Travertine’s possible legal defenses to the
claim and the likelihood that pursuing the claim would be extremely costly as
influencing his decision to settle. Id. at 17.
135. Id. at 17.
136. See supra note 90.
137. See In re Kaufman, 37 P.3d 845, 850-51 (Okla. 2001) (“Valid assignments
pass the assignor’s title, leaving no interest to be reached by a creditor.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(1) (1981) (explaining that in an
assignment, the “assignor’s right to performance by the obligor is extinguished . . .
and the assignee acquires a right to such performance”).
138. See Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (E.D. Mich.
1998) (“[T]he obligor, the party obligated to perform, would not suffer any harm
by a mere assignment of payments under a contract.”).
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invalidate any assignments attempted in violation of the clause,
139
even if the clauses do not specifically state that will be the result.
However, the arguments the court used to reach that conclusion
are flawed and the failure to adopt the more flexible modern
approach means Minnesota is out of step with other states and
missing the policy benefits the modern approach provides.
A. The Court’s Problematic Assessment of Minnesota Case Law
The court’s statement that Minnesota’s precedent on the
140
is
validity of anti-assignment clauses was “well-established”
141
questionable, and this statement provides the underpinning for
the court’s entire first argument. Case law holds some evidence
that the statement is correct. For example, the supreme court in
Sauber v. Northland Insurance Co. held an assignment made in
violation of an anti-assignment clause was void until the insurance
142
company consented to the assignment. In addition, the court of
appeals has held in several cases, albeit in conclusory language with
143
little analysis, that such assignments were void.
However, neither of the cases that the supreme court chose to
support its analysis in Travertine actually dealt with an antiassignment clause. In Wilkie, the issue was whether a bankrupt
139. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
140. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn.
2004).
141. As the appeals court noted, Minnesota case law on the subject is “limited.”
Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 670 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003), rev’d, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn. 2004).
142. 251 Minn. 237, 248, 87 N.W.2d 591, 599 (1958) (“It is of course axiomatic
that the policy could not be assigned without the consent of the defendant.”).
However, the clause in question stated an assignment “shall not bind the company
until its consent is endorsed hereon,” language which might qualify as taking away
the power to assign. Id. at 247, 87 N.W.2d at 599.
143. See Bank Midwest, Minn., Iowa, N.A. v. Lipetzky, 661 N.W.2d 290, 294
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding clause that stated buyer could not assign without
written permission voided an assignment made without consent), rev’d on other
grounds by 674 N.W.2d 176 (Minn. 2004); Mears Park Holding Corp. v.
Morse/Diesel, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 281, 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
assignment was invalid because of the non-assignment clause, the personal nature
of the contract, and the fact that the contract was still executory); Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Minn. v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. C7-01-1287, 2002 WL 378129, at *4
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2002) (“When the terms of the contract provide that it is
nonassignable, the contract may not be assigned unless the provision is waived.”).
But see S O Designs USA, Inc. v. Rollerblade, Inc., 620 N.W.2d 48, 55 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000) (assuming both assignor and assignee were liable for royalty payments
owed the plaintiff despite the anti-assignment clause).
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defendant could make valid assignments of the proceeds from an
144
In Vetter, the court had to decide
upcoming sale of his property.
whether insurance policy holders had agreed to release their
insurance company from any future liability when the company
145
delegated its duties to another insurer.
Though both decisions
recited the rule that parties could agree their contract rights were
not assignable, neither provided guidance about the required form
146
or preferred model of interpretation for anti-assignment clauses.
Thus, the Travertine decision seems to take the casually recited
147
“something” indicating intent suggested by Wilkie and turn it into
an all-encompassing “anything.” The supreme court’s leap from
this unspecific recital to a broad rule on a controversial subject is
troubling. The court was free to reject the Restatement (Second)
148
provision, but it could have done so by searching through more
Minnesota case law and making a more convincing argument for
adopting the early approach. Also, nothing in Minnesota case law
prohibited the court from adopting the Restatement (Second)
approach, despite the supreme court’s recitation to the contrary.
The vague language in Wilkie and Vetter, both of which stated that
assignments were valid unless prohibited, would have been
consistent with the adoption of the modern approach, which
149
defines how assignments may be prohibited.
In sum, the court
could have taken the opportunity in Travertine to adopt the modern
approach for interpreting anti-assignment clauses.
B. The Interpretation of the Restatement (Second) Provision
150

The court’s reading of Bank of America, N.A. v. Moglia, the
foundation for its interpretation of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts’ rule, seems to neglect the key point of the case. Judge

144. Wilkie v. Becker, 268 Minn. 262, 264, 128 N.W.2d 704, 706 (1964).
145. Vetter v. Sec. Cont’l Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 1997).
146. Id.; Wilkie, 268 Minn. at 267, 128 N.W.2d at 707.
147. 268 Minn. at 267, 128 N.W.2d at 707.
148. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Minn.
2004).
149. See Vetter, 567 N.W.2d at 521 (explaining a right could be assigned “in the
absence of a contractual provision to the contrary”); Wilkie, 268 Minn. at 267, 128
N.W.2d at 707 (stating a right to payment of money could be assigned “unless
there is something in the terms of the contract manifesting the intention of the
parties that it shall not be assigned”).
150. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2003); see supra
text accompanying notes 126-130.
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Posner’s opinion did reject the need to use “magic words” in the
anti-assignment clause, but it went on to use different criteria to
151
establish whether the assignment should be valid.
Instead of
examining the precise language, the Moglia opinion considered the
circumstances of the contract, as suggested by a comment in the
152
Restatement. The court considered that the assignee had notice of
the anti-assignment provision and that the alternative remedy, a
153
lawsuit for breach of the provision, was untenable and decided to
154
hold the assignment invalid based on those circumstances.
The
circumstances analysis, not the rejection of specific wording, was
the crux of the case. In a later opinion, Judge Posner himself cited
Moglia in a suggestion that an assignment violating an anti155
assignment clause would be invalid if it violated public policy. In
Travertine, by contrast, the supreme court did not examine the
circumstances of the contract; the court merely rejected the need
for “magic words” but went no further, finding the parties’ intent
156
from the “plain meaning of the words employed.”
157
In addition, all but one of the other cases the supreme court
cited to support its reading of the Restatement (Second) were
158
structured settlement cases, of which Grieve v. General American
159
Life Insurance Co. is representative. A structured settlement is an
“arrangement for periodic payment of damages established by
160
settlement or judgment in resolution of a tort claim,” often used
to compensate severely injured tort victims who need long-term

151. Moglia, 330 F.3d at 948.
152. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 (1981)); see
supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
153. Because the lawsuit involved a bankruptcy, a lawsuit for breach of the antiassignment clause would have had to be filed by the trustee on behalf of the
general creditors against the trustee as representative of the bankrupt. Moglia, 330
F.3d at 948.
154. Id.
155. Cook, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 333 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2003).
156. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn.
2004).
157. Parrish Chiropractic Ctrs., P.C. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 1049,
1053 (Colo. 1994) (adopting first approach, in which assignments made in
violation of an anti-assignment clause are always void, based on two public policy
reasons: freedom of contract and the need to keep down medical costs).
158. Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 274 n.3.
159. 58 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Vt. 1999).
160. Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 529 n.3 (Conn. 2000)
(quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225f(a)(5) (2004)).
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161

support.
Sometimes, as in Grieve, the tort victim attempts to
assign the right to future payments from the settlement in return
for a smaller but immediate lump sum payment because of dire
162
financial need.
In Grieve, the court decided circumstances
weighed in favor of voiding an assignment of future payments the
plaintiff was to receive, without regard to the anti-assignment
163
clause’s specific language.
The court based its decision on two
factors: (1) the tax benefits the insurance company received under
the structured settlement, which would be obliterated if the
164
assignment were upheld; and (2) the legislative policy favoring
such long-term payment plans for the protection of tort victims, a
policy that would be violated if injured parties could assign their
165
benefits “at an exorbitant rate of interest.” Thus, the decisions in
these structured settlement cases, on which the court’s reading of
the Restatement depends, are based at least partially on the
166
circumstances of the case, not the wording of the clause.
161. Usually, the defendant (or its assignee) purchases an annuity policy to
fund the victim’s payments. See, e.g., J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Ltd. P’ship v. Callahan,
649 N.W.2d 695, 696 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing rotary mower accident in
which victim agreed to settlement of lifetime payments).
162. In Grieve, a woman rendered paraplegic in a bicycle accident attempted to
assign her structured settlement payments of $104,800 over ten years for a lump
sum payment of $39,862 to pay debts incurred as a result of her frequent
hospitalizations and inability to work. 58 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
163. Id. at 324.
164. Id. at 323. In CGU Life Insurance Co. v. Singer Asset Finance Co., the Georgia
Court of Appeals explained the tax benefits received by the payor or its assignee
for buying an annuity out of which it makes payments to the tort victim: “Under
current Internal Revenue Service regulations, the [payor or its assignee] is eligible
to have any amounts it receives from the annuity excluded from its gross income
so long as, among other things, such periodic payments are not ‘accelerated,
deferred, increased, or decreased by the recipient.’” 553 S.E.2d 8, 12 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 130(c)(2)(B) (1997)). Should the IRS determine that
the sale or assignment of future benefits to a third party violates the above-listed
conditions, such a transfer could jeopardize the tax advantages of the structured
settlement agreements under IRS regulations. Payees also receive tax benefits—
they can exclude the payments from their taxable income. Id.
165. Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 324. In Grieve, the rate of interest being charged
was 18.88%, compounded daily. Id. at 322.
166. Other cases cited by the Travertine opinion to support this point include
Liberty Life Assurance Co. v. Stone Street Capital, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 630 (D. Md.
2000), Johnson v. First Colony Life Insurance Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (C.D. Cal.
1998), J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Limited Partnership v. Callahan, 649 N.W.2d 695, and
CGU Life Insurance Co. v. Singer Asset Finance Co., 553 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001),
which all decided that an anti-assignment clause that took away the “power” to
assign a structured settlement agreement made an assignment invalid based
upon—among other factors—the possible loss of tax benefits to the payor. In
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The circumstances in Travertine do not appear to justify
holding the assignment invalid. Neither James Lennon nor
Travertine would have suffered any particular adverse
consequences because of the assignment. Lennon, who assigned
his compensation to satisfy a judgment, was not being exploited as
were the structured settlement victims, who were trading the right
to long-term payments for a much smaller, immediately payable
167
lump sum.
For Travertine Corp., the attempted assignment was
merely the transfer of a right to receive payment, so the assignment
would have changed nothing except where Travertine sent the
168
check. In this situation, some cases have held that assignments of
such a right could not be invalidated because there was no reason
169
to prohibit such transfers.
As one court wrote, “The rationale
behind these cases is derived from the implicit recognition that the
obligor, the party obligated to perform, would not suffer any harm
170
by a mere assignment of payments under a contract.”
Thus,
under the Moglia “all the circumstances” rule, the circumstances of
Lennon’s assignment to Lexington-Silverwood would not weigh in
favor of invalidating the transfer.
By rejecting both of the standard interpretive approaches to
the Restatement (Second) provision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
eviscerated the modern Restatement rule. Under the court’s
reading, the subtleties of the Restatement’s approach were lost; it
became the same as the broad rule the court created under
171
Wilkie.
This apparently was not the intent of the Restatement’s

addition, all of the cited cases specifically eliminated the parties’ power to assign, a
wording which, under most courts’ versions of the modern rule, would invalidate
the assignment. See Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 535 (Conn.
2000) (holding assignment was valid because the contract did not expressly limit
power to assign). Thus, these cases do not qualify as rejections of the modern
rule.
167. See supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
168. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Minn.
2004). Tax benefits would not have been at stake in this situation as they were for
the payors in the structured settlements, when the payees assigned their rights to
payment. See supra note 164.
169. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Am. Med. Int’l, Inc. v.
Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 773 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Ark. 1989) (interpreting
Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-58-102 as invalidating an anti-assignment
clause in a health insurance contract that attempted to prohibit the assignment of
a right to receive payment under the contract).
170. Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (E.D. Mich.
1998).
171. See supra text accompanying note 124.
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drafters who made the change in order to limit restraints on
172
alienation, and it is not the way the majority of courts have
173
interpreted the provision.
Again, the supreme court was free, although not bound, to
reject the Restatement (Second) provision. Once the court chose to
analyze the case under the Restatement rule, however, the court
174
should have found the assignment valid.
Under the Cedar Point
Apartments approach to the Restatement, the words “shall not be
assignable” do not sufficiently demonstrate intent to make the
175
assignment ineffective.
Under the Moglia approach, the
circumstances do not justify making the assignment invalid. No
176
policy reasons, as in the structured settlement cases, or practical
177
impediments, as in Moglia, validate the decision to make this
178
mere promise self-executing.
Thus, the court’s decision creates an apparently clear-cut
precedent on a difficult point of law, but the case’s legacy is likely
to be confused because its reasoning is flawed. The supreme court
analyzed the case under both the early and modern approaches,
probably because the court needed to buttress its weak argument
179
under Minnesota precedent.
The court forced the outcome in
this case to be the same under both the Restatement and early
approaches, but the two rules should have led to opposite

172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. a (1981) (stating
that courts have applied the policy against restraints on alienation when
interpreting contractual terms open to more than one construction).
173. Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 535 n.10 (Conn. 2000).
174. The appeals court, which also applied the Restatement (Second) of Contacts,
found the assignment valid. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 670
N.W.2d 444, 449 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn. 2004).
175. 693 F.2d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 1982). Travertine Corp. attempted to argue
that the language in the anti-assignment clause actually fulfilled the Cedar Point
Apartments criteria, but the court did not even address Travertine’s rather feeble
argument, preserved in its brief: “The language of the non-assignment clause [‘the
rights and obligations of Berkey/Lennon shall not be assignable’] is much
broader than that found in Cedar Point . . . . The language chosen refers to the
‘rights and obligations’ and serves to prohibit the power to assign.” Brief of
Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at 23. This argument makes no sense.
The relevant language is “shall not be assignable,” which is not specific enough to
trigger invalidation under the modern rule. Adding the nouns “rights and
obligations” changes nothing.
176. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 41.
179. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Minn.
2004); see supra Part IV.A.
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180

outcomes.
The court appeared to be unnecessarily closing
avenues toward the adoption of the modern approach, despite the
advantages it includes.
C. Policy Implications of the Modern Approach
The true problem with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s snub
of the modern approach is that the decision ignores the policy
advantages of the more nuanced rule. Under the modern rule, the
burden of a breach falls on the party less likely to sustain an
181
injury and all parties avoid restraints on alienation, with their
182
resulting transaction costs.
Finally, although an obligor may
argue that a mere breach of contract is not what it meant to
bargain for, the modern approach simply enforces the literal
183
agreement of the parties, whatever that happens to be.
First, whether the assignment is held valid or invalid, the party
most disadvantaged will be the proper one—the assignor, who
presumably knew about the anti-assignment clause and attempted
to transfer rights anyway. The assignment’s validity merely changes
which of the other two parties still has cause of action against the
assignor. If the assignment is held valid, the obligor will have a
184
claim for breach of contract; if it is held invalid, the assignee
185
will.
The obligor often will not be quantifiably harmed by an
assignment of rights, in an assignment of the right to payment, the
186
obligor merely has to pay another party. In other circumstances,
the obligor likely will not be harmed by having to perform its preexisting duty for the assignee if the assignor and assignee share
187
similar attributes.
Also, under both the Restatement (First) and
180. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31, 38-40.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 184-189.
182. See infra text accompanying notes 190-192.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 193-195.
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(b) (1981); see supra note
40 and accompanying text.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(c) (1981) (“A contract
term prohibiting assignment of rights under the contract, unless a different
intention is manifested . . . (c) is for the benefit of the obligor, and does not
prevent the assignee from acquiring rights against the assignor . . . .”).
186. See Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (E.D. Mich.
1998).
187. See Matthew Horowitz, Resolving Performance Bond Exposures Through
Assignment of Bonded Contracts 4 (Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 2004) (unpublished
document presented at the Fifteenth Annual Northeast Surety and Fidelity Claims
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Restatement (Second) approaches to assignments, obligors already are
protected from having to perform if their duty would be materially
changed by the assignment, even without an anti-assignment
188
clause. If the obligor is left with a cause of action, a lawsuit likely
will not be necessary. For the assignee, however, holding the
assignment invalid means it loses the benefit of its bargain with the
189
assignor and gains merely a cause of action for breach. When the
language of the anti-assignment clause is open to more than one
interpretation, the modern approach properly leaves the cause of
action to the party less likely to have an injury to redress.
Second, allowing assignments freely whenever extra costs will
not be imposed on the obligor is economically efficient. An
assignment of an existing contract saves transaction costs for the
obligor and the assignee, who otherwise might have to renegotiate
190
a contract that already exists in a presumably acceptable form. In
general, restraints on alienation, such as assignments, are
disfavored because they increase transaction costs, keeping

Conference) (on file with author) (explaining that it would be “difficult” or
“impossible” to show a loss when rights under a construction contract are assigned
to a competent replacement; “[t]herefore, while the opportunity exists for a party
to seek damages for an assignment in a jurisdiction that applies the majority rule,
the reality is that there will generally be no damages caused by an assignment”).
188. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 151(a) (1932) (“A right may be the
subject of effective assignment unless, (a) the substitution of a right of the
assignee for the right of the assignor would vary materially the duty of the obligor,
or increase materially the burden or risk imposed upon him by his contract, or
impair materially his chance of obtaining return performance . . . .”); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)(a) (1981) (repeating the
Restatement (First) rule and adding that assignments also are invalid if the
substitution of the assignee would “materially reduce [the contract’s] value to [the
obligor]”); see also Cedar Point Apts., Ltd. v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 F.2d 748,
753 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 317(2)(a) when
explaining an assignment was valid partially because the seller’s duty to convey
title to real property was not changed by the assignment); Estate of Frantz v. Page,
426 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Restatement (Second) section
317(2)(a) when explaining an assignment of a note did not release guarantors
from their obligations because the evidence did not clearly show the guarantors’
risk was materially increased after the assignment).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(c) (1981) (“A contract
term prohibiting assignment of rights under the contract, unless a different
intention is manifested . . . is for the benefit of the obligor, and does not prevent
the assignee from acquiring rights against the assignor . . . .”).
190. See Horowitz, supra note 187, at 6 (“An assignment . . . may obviate the
need for the obligee to execute any new contract documents. Drafting new
contract documents can be time-consuming and contentious . . . .”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/3

26

Anderson: Contracts—Looking for "Something": Minnesota's New Rule for Inter
08JOY_ANDERSON.DOC

2006]

5/31/2006 1:14:25 PM

INTERPRETING ANTI-ASSIGNMENT CLAUSES

1461
191

property out of the hands of the user to whom it is most valuable.
192
Because the obligor is unlikely to incur extra expense, the
modern approach of enforcing assignments unless the parties
expressly agreed to invalidate them makes economic sense.
Finally, the modern approach allows contracting parties who
truly believe they would be disadvantaged by an assignment to
bargain for and enforce an anti-assignment clause. The modern
approach does not infringe on the parties’ freedom to contract, it
193
executes what the parties literally agreed.
On occasion, the rule
might upset the expectations of obligors who believed the other
party did not have the power to assign the contract, but if the
obligor actually suffered any injury, those damages still would be
194
recoverable.
This rule is more equitable not only in the abstract, but also as
applied to Travertine.
Leaving Travertine, not LexingtonSilverwood, with a cause of action against Lennon for breaching
the contract would have been a fairer result. If the assignment had
been valid, Travertine merely would have had to pay LexingtonSilverwood whatever it owed Lennon instead of realizing a windfall
and Lexington-Silverwood would have gained some recompense
195
for its judgment against Lennon.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the years, courts, like Humpty Dumpty, have made the
words of anti-assignment clauses do a great deal of work, employing
them in many different meanings. In Travertine, the Minnesota
Supreme Court resolved the historical inconsistencies, though it
191. Richard A. Epstein, Symposium on Law and Economics: Why Restrain
Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 972 (1985) (“Most voluntary transactions move
property from lower to higher value uses. . . . [A]ny gratuitous proliferation of the
number of necessary parties to the transaction [as occurs when restraints on
alienation are imposed] can only impede the frequency with which these
transactions take place, creating in the long run substantial losses for the original
owners. In addition, there are apt to be substantial losses to third parties as well.
Voluntary exchanges work for the mutual benefit of both sides, and where these
are restrained, potential purchasers share in the losses that are held by original
owners.”).
192. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. McKinnon, 688 S.W.2d 612, 615
(Tex. App. 1985) (“[B]ecause the contract term only forbids assignment; it does
not render an assignment ineffective.”).
194. See supra text accompanying note 40.
195. See supra Part III.D.
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had to stretch its own case law and raze a Restatement provision to
196
By holding that assignments attempted in violation of a
do so.
“specific and unmistakable” anti-assignment clause would always be
ineffective, whatever the precise wording of the clause or the
circumstances, the court appeared to create a firm precedent for
197
future cases. However, because of the flaws under the surface of
the court’s reasoning, Travertine’s rule could lead to difficult or
198
conflicting results in future cases. Nothing in Minnesota case law
199
mandated the court’s rejection of the modern approach, which is
followed by a majority of jurisdictions, promoted by the Restatement
200
201
(Second) of Contracts, and supported by a policy analysis. In sum,
the court could have adopted the modern approach as Minnesota’s
rule for interpreting anti-assignment clauses and created a
precedent with clearer and more equitable implications for future
cases.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See supra Part IV.
See supra text accompanying note 128.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part IV.C.
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